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EMINENT DOMAIN AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN
GEORGIA: A GROWING STATE’S NEED FOR A
NEW FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE
Crystal Genteman *
INTRODUCTION
“The domestic tranquility is gone,” said Jacksonville, Florida
resident Joseph Santoni, whose front yard was partially taken by the
Jacksonville Transit Authority (JTA) for a four year construction
easement. 1 After the JTA started widening the two lane historic and
scenic Fort Caroline Road 2 into a four lane, Santoni often found his
driveway blocked by construction equipment and his landscaping
torn up. 3 Like many state constitutions and the Federal Constitution,4
Florida’s constitution guarantees that property owners receive just
compensation when their property is taken. 5 For the forty-eight
month easement, the JTA offered Santoni a mere $1,400 in
compensation. 6 Dissatisfied with the JTA’s offer, Santoni, along with
nineteen other Fort Caroline Road property owners, took their cases
to trial. 7
Although Florida juries awarding just compensation typically are
not allowed to consider the impact of a taking on the adjacent
property, Santoni’s attorney argued that Florida case law often
recognized an exception in road projects. 8 Thus, Santoni’s attorneys,
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank Christian
Togrimson and Professor Colin Crawford for their assistance.
1. Tony Quesada, Jury to Decide Compensation in Road Project Partial Takings, JACKSONVILLE
BUS. J., Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/
stories/2006/08/21/story04.html.
2. Kandace Lankford, Canal, Trees on Minds of Planners, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Mar. 20, 2002,
available at http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/032002/neR_8904323.shtml.
3. Quesada, supra note 1.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
6. Tony Quesada, JTA Must Pay More for Wonderwood Property, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J., Aug. 28,
2006, available at http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2006/08/28/daily1.html.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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who also represented the other homeowners, argued that the JTA had
failed to recognize the damage that would be done to the
homeowners’ property adjacent to the road in addition to the damages
caused to the actual part taken. 9 Mr. Santoni’s trial was combined
with two of the other homeowners, and at the joint trial, the jury
awarded Mr. Santoni $40,000. 10 The total judgment for all three
homeowners was $105,150 more than the JTA had originally
offered. 11 “We wanted to make them whole because they were
sacrificing for the good of the community,” said one juror. 12 Florida’s
fee-shifting statute requires that property owners are made whole
through the reimbursement of their attorneys’ fees, 13 and following
an extensive hearing, the circuit judge entered a final judgment on
costs requiring the JTA to pay a substantial portion of the owners’
litigation expenses. 14 Without a fee-shifting statute, would the Fort
Caroline Road residents have been able to challenge the
government’s offers? Is mandating that the government pay property
owners’ attorneys’ fees in eminent domain cases therefore necessary
to ensure that property owners receive just compensation and are
made whole?
Until 2006, Georgia also had a fee-shifting statute. 15 However, the
General Assembly repealed the statute as part of Georgia’s eminent
domain reform, 16 which was enacted in reaction to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London. 17 Georgia, like
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Quesada, supra note 6.
13. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2009).
14. Jacksonville Transp. Auth. v. McEldowney, No. 02-02083-CA CV-C, Duval County, Fla. (2007)
(on file with author). See infra notes 145–57 for a detailed explanation of the mechanics of Florida’s
fee-shifting statutes.
15. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-2-84.1 (1982), repealed by 2006 Ga. Laws 39, § 6.
16. HB 1313, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
17. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that the city could authorize a private
developer to take landowners’ properties for a large-scale redevelopment project because it constituted a
“public use” under the Fifth Amendment). In a dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor warned that
following the holding, “[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton,
any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.” Id. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Public outcry was swift and fierce to the Court’s interpretation of “public use.” Michael Allen
Wolf, Hysteria Versus History: Public Use in the Public Eye, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY
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almost every other state, 18 passed substantial eminent domain reform
with the intent of preventing eminent domain from being used in
redevelopment projects as it was in Kelo, while also providing
citizens with more procedural protections. 19 One such procedural
protection was the repeal of Georgia’s former fee-shifting statute 20
because the statute had a chilling effect on eminent domain
litigation. 21 A property owner who appealed an award of just
compensation could not be reimbursed for his own litigation expenses
even if he received a larger amount on appeal than the government’s
initial offer; however, if the property owner did not recover a certain
amount on appeal, he would be forced to pay the government’s
expenses. 22 Through repealing the statute, the General Assembly
removed an important barrier to litigation for property owners who
feared having to pay the government’s expenses. However, this left a
gap in Georgia law because the General Assembly failed to enact a
new fee-shifting statute, such as Florida’s statute, that would
reimburse property owners who are successful in their appeals for
their attorneys’ fees in eminent domain litigation—thus ensuring they
are made whole.
Georgia’s constitution guarantees that private property will not be
taken without “just and adequate compensation.” 23 Although owners
and condemning authorities often disagree about a dollar figure that
is “just and adequate,” many property owners lack the sufficient
resources to challenge the government in an eminent domain
proceeding if they feel the government’s offer is too low. For those
DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 15 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008) (documenting the chronology
of extensive negative media coverage following the decision and arguing that the newsworthiness of the
decision at the time it was announced, the sharp dissents in Kelo, and the explosion of politically
conservative media were substantial factors influencing public response to the opinion).
18. CASTLE COALITION, 50 STATE REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT DOMAIN LEGISLATION SINCE
KELO 1 (2007) (noting that two years after the Kelo decision, forty-two states had passed some form of
eminent domain reform).
19. Jody Arogeti et al., General Provisions and Condemnation Procedure: Provide a Comprehensive
Revision of Provisions Regarding the Power of Eminent Domain, Crimes and Offenses, 23 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 157 (2006).
20. Id. at 179.
21. See infra notes 115–26.
22. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-2-84.1 (1982), repealed by 2006 Ga. Laws 39, § 6.
23. GA. CONST. art. I § 3, ¶ 1.
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who can either afford to hire an attorney or find an attorney who will
work on a contingent fee basis, any potential recovery is offset by
litigation expenses, including attorneys’ fees. 24
Due to Georgia’s extensive growth in recent years, Georgia
landowners are in special need of a statute authorizing the recovery
of attorneys’ fees for property owners in eminent domain
proceedings. Between 1990 and 2000, Georgia saw a 26.4%
population increase. 25 Experts expect this rapid growth to continue
and predict that the state’s population will swell by 34% between the
years 2000 and 2015. 26 Population growth increases demand for state
services, which in turn results in more instances of condemnation of
private property for public use. 27 With such dramatic changes in a
relatively short period of time, Georgia has encountered some severe
growing pains. 28 Although Atlanta is the eighth-largest metropolitan

24. See infra notes 194–223 for a detailed discussion of financial limitations on the property owner’s
ability to litigate his position.
25. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLAN. & BUDGET, GEORGIA IN PERSPECTIVE 8 (2009),
http://opb.georgia.gov/vgn/images/portal/cit_1210/45/18/162784478Georgia_in_Perspective_2009.pdf.
Between 2000 and 2007, Georgia’s population grew at 16.6%, “more than twice the national growth rate
of 7.2%.” Id. at 9. During the same time period, Georgia’s population growth was the fastest of all
Southern states, even outpacing Florida. Id.
26. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLAN. & BUDGET, GEORGIA 2015 POPULATION PREDICTIONS 1 (2005),
http://www.opb.state.ga.us/media/3016/georgia_population_projections_reduced_web_5_25_05.pdf.
27. See Memorandum from the Georgia Department of Transportation Office of Right of Way
Acquisition (Nov. 6, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter GDOT Memorandum]. The information
referenced from this Memorandum is unpublished and was gained from the author’s public records
request to the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT).
Between 2000 and 2007, the number of properties acquired by the GDOT, in the areas of both
acquisitions by deed as well as condemnations, increased in Georgia. In 2000, GDOT acquired 1,715
properties by deed, as compared to 2,307 in 2005. The number of acquisitions by deed was greatest in
2006 at 3,226 properties, then declined somewhat in 2007 and 2008 with 2,948 and 2,748 acquisitions
by deed respectively. In those same years, the number of properties acquired by eminent domain showed
a similar pattern. In 2006, GDOT acquired 409 properties via eminent domain as compared to only 169
acquisitions via eminent domain in 2000. The number of acquisitions via eminent domain then dropped
to 372 in 2007. Id.
Consequently, eminent domain is a growing area of practice in Georgia, as evidenced by the
State Bar of Georgia’s addition of an eminent domain section in 2001. State Bar Appoints Charles
Ruffin as Chairman of Eminent Domain Section, BUSINESS WIRE, Feb. 12, 2002, available at
http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/legal-services-law-practice-major-us-firms/5897403-1.html (“Ruffin
says, eminent domain litigation is a growing practice in the state of Georgia due to the surge in
population growth over the past twenty years.”).
28. Christopher Quinn, State No. 1 in Growing Counties; Population Boom Brings Gifts, Problems,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 16, 2006, at 1C (“[As] tax bases grow . . . so do headaches . . . as leaders
scramble to keep up with demand for new roads, schools and services.”).
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city29 and second-fastest growing city 30 in the United States, it has
the second-worst metropolitan traffic congestion in the nation.31
Despite being the country’s fourth-fastest growing state, Georgia is
fourth from the bottom in transportation funding. 32
As with many states, severe budget constraints due to the
economic downturn have compounded funding problems in
Georgia. 33 However, the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act
of 2009 (commonly known as the federal stimulus package) provided
a sudden boom of funding for state infrastructure projects. 34 As of
September 2009, Georgia allocated nearly $300 million to highway
stimulus projects that were at work or were about to begin, with an
additional $450 million in projects planned throughout the remainder
of the year. 35 With this rapid explosion in population growth and
money made available to fund much-needed public infrastructure
projects through stimulus funding, increased condemnation of private
property was both necessary and inevitable.
29. Mary Lou Pickel, Atlanta Still a Magnet, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 19, 2009, at 1A.
30. Id. Between the years 2000 and 2008, the only city outpacing Atlanta in growth was Dallas,
Texas. During that time period Atlanta added over one million people. Id.
31. Doug Stoner, Solutions Now, Not Later, GA. TREND, Dec. 2007, available at
http://www.georgiatrend.com/guest-commentary/12_07_guest.shtml. As of 2007, the only United States
city with worse traffic congestion than Atlanta was Los Angeles. Id.
32. Jerry Grillo, Traffic Gridlock: Can Atlanta’s Traffic Be Fixed?, GA. TREND, Apr. 2009, available
at http://www.georgiatrend.com/features-economic-development/10_07_transportation_01.shtml. Two
of Georgia’s metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) rank in the country’s twenty-five fastest-growing
MSAs, with six counties experiencing growth rates over 40%. GEORGIA IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 25,
at 8. Although such a plan has not been implemented, a 2006 article reported that “[t]he latest proposal
on the transportation front is a 23-lane I-75 north of town” to deal with the growth. Quinn, supra note
28.
33. Alan Essig, Cutting State Spending May Only Worsen Georgia’s Budget Crisis, ATHENS
BANNER-HERALD, Jan. 8, 2009, available at http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/010809/
opi_374971938.shtml (“Georgia is facing the most severe fiscal crisis since the Great Depression.”);
James Salzer, Revenue Dip May Mean More Cuts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 9, 2009, at 1A (reporting
that the state is “struggling with the worst fiscal crisis since the Great Depression”). In fact, the budget
crisis is so dire in Georgia that teachers and university employees were furloughed. Laura Diamond,
Unpaid Days Off Set at Colleges, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 7, 2009, at 1A.
34. Tom Crawford, Money from Washington, GA. TREND, Apr. 2009, available at
http://www.georgiatrend.com/politics/04_09_politics.shtml (reporting that of the six billion dollars
allocated to Georgia, one billion will go to the Department of Transportation for road and bridge
projects). The Georgia Department of Transportation tracks these projects on its homepage at
http://www.dot.state.ga.us/informationcenter/gastimulus/Pages/default.aspx.
35. Press Release, Ga. Dep’t of Transp., $51 Million in GA Transportation Projects Awarded (Sept.
1, 2009), available at http://www.dot.state.ga.us/informationcenter/gastimulus/Documents/Releases/d79-1-09.pdf.
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As Georgia continues to expand, legislators must work to ensure
that property owners receive their constitutionally guaranteed just and
adequate compensation. Part I of this Note reviews the requirement
of just compensation both federally and in Georgia, the condemnation
procedure in Georgia, and Georgia’s limited statutory authorization
for a landowner recovering attorneys’ fees in condemnation cases. 36
Part II discusses the federal government’s approach and other states’
approaches to fee-shifting statutes in eminent domain proceedings. 37
Finally, Part III analyzes Georgia’s need for a new fee-shifting statute
in eminent domain cases that would mandate that property owners be
compensated for their attorneys’ fees in valuation challenges and
proposes a model statute to be introduced in the General Assembly.38
Such a statute is crucial to ensuring that property owners are made
whole and receive just and adequate compensation in condemnations.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Requirement of Just Compensation and Attorneys’ Fees
1. The Federal Constitution
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
that private property not be taken for “public use, without just
compensation.” 39 Although the Supreme Court has held that “an
owner is to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have
occupied if his property had not been taken,” 40 the standard for
compensation is generally fair market value. 41 The Court has defined
fair market value as “‘what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a
36. See infra Part I.
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra Part III.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
40. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943); see also United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S.
14, 16 (1970) (holding that “fair and just compensation” should restore the property owner to “the same
position monetarily” that he would have been in had the taking not occurred).
41. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945) (holding that “the compensation to
be paid is the value of the interest taken,” and “[i]n the ordinary case, for want of a better standard,
market value, so called, is the criterion of that value”).
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willing seller’ at the time of the taking.” 42 Although many property
rights advocates as well as scholars have proposed alternate methods
for determining just compensation, fair market value continues to be
the standard. 43
In Armstrong v. United States, Justice Black asserted, “The Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.” 44 However, under federal law a property owner’s attorneys’
fees have not been interpreted to be a burden that the public should
have to pay, and the property owner must bear these alone since they
are not recoverable as part of just compensation under the United
States Constitution. 45
2. Georgia Constitution
a. Just and Adequate Compensation
Georgia’s constitution, similar to the federal Constitution,
mandates that “private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first
42. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (citing Miller, 317 U.S. at 374).
43. See generally Rachel D. Godsil & David Simunovich, Just Compensation in an Ownership
Society, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 133 (Robin Paul
Malloy ed., 2008); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L.
R EV . 871, 874 (2007) (noting that some scholars have proposed that property owners receive no
compensation at all for small takings, while others “doubt[] the wisdom of the eminent domain power
altogether”). In Kelo, the most recent Supreme Court eminent domain case, the Court declined to
address the issue of fair compensation, noting that “[w]hile important, [fair compensation is] not before
us in this litigation.” Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 n.21 (2005).
44. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). See generally Gideon Kanner, “Unequal
Justice Under Law”: The Invidiously Disparate Treatment of American Property Owners in Taking
Cases, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065, 1088 (2007) (arguing that despite the Court’s “flowery language”
and “benign-sounding judicial rhetoric,” its rulings are “harsh” and “exclude factors that sellers and
buyers in voluntary transactions would consider”).
45. United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979) (in assessing whether petitioner was
entitled to the recovery of appraisal fees, the Court commented that “[p]erhaps it would be fair or
efficient to compensate a landowner for all the costs he incurs as a result of a condemnation action,” but
nevertheless rejected petitioner’s request, holding that “such compensation is a matter of legislative
grace rather than constitutional command”); Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368 (1930) (“Attorneys’
fees and expenses are not embraced within just compensation for land taken by eminent domain.”).
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paid.” 46 Furthermore, the constitution provides that “[t]he General
Assembly may provide by law for the payment by the condemnor of
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by the
condemnee in determining just and adequate compensation.” 47 Thus,
although the constitution allows for the payment of attorneys’ fees, it
does not require it.
A property’s value is calculated according to the fair market value
at the time of the taking. 48 Much like the Supreme Court’s definition
of fair market value, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that fair
market value is “the price a seller who desires, but is not required, to
sell and a buyer who desires, but is not required, to buy, would agree
is a fair price, after due consideration of all the elements reasonably
affecting value.” 49
b. Attorneys’ Fees as Part of Just and Adequate Compensation
Georgia property owners cannot recover their attorneys’ fees in
eminent domain litigation as a component of just compensation.50
However, this has not always been the case. Although the Georgia
Supreme Court has not changed its position on this issue in nearly
forty years, in the 1960s the court waivered in its jurisprudence as to
whether the Georgia constitution requires that property owners be
reimbursed for their attorneys’ fees as part of just compensation and
whether the court has the authority to make that decision. 51
According to the Georgia Supreme Court’s most recent decision on
this issue in 1971 in Bowers v. Fulton County, litigation expenses
such as attorneys’ fees and expert testimony fees are not included in
just and adequate compensation. 52 Instead, these costs are
“recoverable only where authorized by some provision or contract.” 53
46. GA. CONST. art. I, § III, ¶ I.
47. Id.
48. Wright v. MARTA, 283 S.E.2d 466, 468 (1981).
49. Clary v. City of Stockbridge, 686 S.E.2d 288, 291 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis omitted).
50. Bowers v. Fulton County, 183 S.E.2d 347, 349 (Ga. 1971).
51. See discussion infra notes 52–75.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 348 (“No provision is made in the Constitution or by statute that authorizes the award of
attorney fees and expenses of litigation as a part of just compensation.”). In reaching its decision, the
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In Bowers, the court reasoned that a right to recover attorneys’ fees in
condemnation litigation did not exist at common law and therefore
held to the general rule that attorneys’ fees are not recoverable absent
statutory provision. 54 Justice Hawes, joined by two other justices,
dissented and pointed out that the majority cited to persuasive
authority rather than to any Georgia cases. 55 Additionally, Justice
Hawes argued that the majority had explicitly disregarded the court’s
prior 1966 ruling in Bowers v. Fulton County requiring that the
condemnee be “compensated for all damage to his property and
expenses caused by the condemnation proceeding.” 56
In addition to lacking a precedential foundation, Justice Hawes
argued that the majority’s holding was neither logical nor reasonable
and that it failed to recognize the unique circumstances of an eminent
domain proceeding. 57 Contrary to a typical lawsuit, the defendant in a
condemnation action has “done no wrong” yet is “being forced to
give up his property against his will.”58 The government has the
advantage of knowing that if a landowner attempts to challenge the
condemnation by going to court, then she will likely recover less than
fair market value once litigation fees are paid. 59 Justice Hawes
therefore reasoned that allowing a landowner to recover attorneys’
fees in condemnation actions would actually reduce rather than foster
litigation since agents, knowing that they might be subject to paying

court analogized to the judicial interpretations of “fair compensation” provisions in the Wisconsin and
California constitutions which do not provide for attorneys’ fees or other litigation expenses. Id.
Interestingly, both Wisconsin and California now have statutory provisions allowing for the recovery of
attorneys’ fees in limited circumstances. In California, attorneys’ fees and appraisal fees are recoverable
where “the condemnee’s final demand for compensation is deemed reasonable, and the condemnor’s
final offer is deemed unreasonable, in light of the evidence admitted in trial and the compensation
awarded.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.410 (2007). In condemnation for sewers and transportation
facilities in Wisconsin, attorneys’ fees are recoverable where the jury verdict as approved by the court
“exceeds the jurisdictional offer or the highest written offer prior to the jurisdictional offer by at least
$700 and at least 15%.” WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2006).
54. Bowers, 183 S.E.2d at 348.
55. Id. at 350 (Hawes, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (citing Bowers v. Fulton County, 146 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. 1966))
57. Id. at 351 (“I think that reason and logic require the conclusion that compensation to a landowner
for the taking of his property can never be ‘just and adequate’ unless he receives that sum which leaves
him whole and undiminished after the completion of the process of taking.”).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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the property owner’s litigation fees, would be forced to make more
reasonable offers. 60 Justice Hawes also argued that the courts, not the
legislature, were the proper authority for construing the meaning of
just compensation within the constitution. 61
Five years later, the court changed direction when deciding to
exercise its power to interpret the constitutional provision for just and
adequate compensation. In White v. Georgia Power Co., the court
held that private property owners in Georgia could recover attorneys’
fees and “all reasonable and necessary expenses of litigation” as part
of “just and adequate compensation.” 62 The court offered little
reasoning for its decision to overturn Bowers other than noting that
since the time of the 1971 ruling in Bowers, five new justices had
joined the court and a majority of these justices felt it necessary to
“reassess the constitutional issue.” 63 Chief Justice Nichols’s
concurring opinion echoed the dissent in Bowers, arguing that the
1971 Bowers court had misapplied the court’s holding in Bowers v.
Fulton County of 1966. 64
In White, the court laid out a procedure for courts to use in
condemnation cases until the General Assembly could adopt formal
legislation. 65 The court’s recommended procedure contained three
basic steps. 66 First, the fact finder would determine the fair market
value of the condemned property as well as consequential damages to
any of the condemnee’s remaining property. 67 Next, the fact finder
would determine if the condemnee had suffered any additional
damages “such as attorney fees and reasonable and necessary
60. Bowers, 183 S.E.2d at 351. According to Justice Hawes, recovery of attorney fees would not
apply where the jury found that the condemnor’s initial offer represented fair market value.
61. Id. at 352.
62. White v. Ga. Power Co., 227 S.E.2d 385, 388 (Ga. 1976), rev’g, Bowers, 183 S.E.2d 347 (1971).
63. Id. at 342–43.
64. Id. at 385 (Nichols, C.J., concurring) (citing Bowers v. Fulton County, 146 S.E.2d 884 (Ga.
1966)). In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Ingram agreed that the decision reflected the majority’s
ruling in the 1966 Bowers case and opined, “In my view, this provision includes reasonable and
necessary attorney fees, and expenses of litigation, which the condemnee must incur in order to obtain
fair market value of his property taken, and, where appropriate, any consequential damages to the
remainder of his property.” Id. at 392 (Ingram, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 343 (majority opinion).
66. Id.
67. Id. The fact finder might be “three assessors, a special master, or a jury.” Id.
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expenses of litigation” and make recommendations to the trial
judge. 68 Finally, upon the fact finder’s recommendation for damages,
the judge would hold a hearing to receive evidence on the amount of
damages and then award the appropriate amount to the property
owner as part of “fair and just compensation.” 69
Following White, the Georgia Supreme Court further developed
the law related to attorneys’ fees in two key cases. In Department of
Transportation v. Doss, the court clarified its holding in White by
holding that only reasonable attorneys’ fees could be awarded. 70
Furthermore, in Department of Transportation v. Flint River Cotton
Mills, the court held that a property owner must receive a jury award
greater than, and not just equal to, the government’s original offer in
order to recover attorneys’ fees. 71
Only two years after White, however, the Georgia Supreme Court
changed course yet again. The court took notice of the General
Assembly’s failure to adopt the model procedure the court had laid
out in White, and in Dekalb County v. Trustees, Decatur Lodge No.
1602, the court overturned White, along with the body of law that it
had developed since its holding. 72 In holding that attorneys’ fees and
other litigation expenses were not required as part of just and
adequate compensation under the constitution, the court emphasized
that the question was one for legislative determination. 73
Chief Justice Nichols sharply dissented to the majority’s reversal
of White, arguing that the court indeed did have the authority to
interpret the constitution of Georgia and that condemnors should not
be able “to coerce a homeowner into accepting less than the full value
of his property based upon a threat, expressed or implied, that if he
68. White, 227 S.E.2d at 343.
69. Id. at 343–44.
70. Dep’t of Transp. v. Doss, 233 S.E.2d 144, 145 (Ga. 1977).
71. Dep’t of Transp. v. Flint River Cotton Mills, 235 S.E.2d 31, 32–33 (Ga. 1977) (reasoning that
“[n]one of the expenses of litigation, including attorney fees, was necessary in this case,” and “[b]ecause
there was no need for the condemnee to have a jury trial in order to be adequately compensated for the
taking in this case, the expenses of litigation, including attorney fees, are not a necessary part of ‘just
and adequate’ compensation here”).
72. DeKalb County v. Trs., Decatur Lodge No. 1602, 251 S.E.2d 243, 244 (Ga. 1978).
73. Id. (“[T]he development of the law in this area by the court illustrates the difficulties encountered
when appellate courts attempt to legislate.”).
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refuses the sum tendered, he will be subjected to the protracted and
costly litigation against the condemning authority’s legions of
lawyers and experts.” 74 Despite Justice Nichols’s prediction that
“[t]he people of Georgia surely will demand restoration of their rights
by way of a constitutional amendment,” 75 neither the court, the
people, nor the legislature have yet to revise the constitution’s
guarantee of full and adequate compensation.
B. Condemnations in Georgia Generally
1. Eminent Domain Reform Following Kelo
In the wake of Kelo, Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue introduced
his “Private Property Protection Act” and announced that
“[g]overnment must always respect the property rights of its
citizens.” 76 The proposal included several provisions aimed at
protecting the property owner, such as “increased notice
requirements,” “additional damages for property owners for
relocation expenses and lost business revenues,” and “awarding
attorneys’ fees to property owners who prevail on appeal.” 77 The
General Assembly held extensive hearings debating various aspects
of Governor Perdue’s proposal as well as other proposals, 78 and less
than a year after Kelo, Governor Perdue signed Georgia’s eminent
domain reform into law. 79
Generally, the Act provided several important procedural
safeguards for property owners by adding new requirements for the
74. Id. at 245 (Nichols, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id. Justice Undercofler wrote a separate dissent in which he asserted, “It is not right; it is not
fair . . . [w]hen you are forced to surrender [land] for the public good, you must be offered its fair price.
If you are forced to sue to obtain its fair price then you must also recover the reasonable costs, including
attorney fees, of waging battle.” Id. at 245 (Undercofler, J., dissenting).
76. Purdue Enters Eminent Domain Fray, ATLANTA BUS. CHRON., Feb. 8, 2006, available at
http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2006/02/06/daily29.html.
77. Press Release, Ga. Republican Party, Gov. Perdue Announces Legislation to Protect Private
Property
Rights
(Feb.
8,
2006),
available
at
http://www.georgia.gov/00/article/
0,2086,78006749_83363896_83365243,00.html [hereinafter Perdue Press Release].
78. See Arogeti et al., supra note 19, at 166, for a detailed summary of legislative hearings
concerning eminent domain reform.
79. Id.
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condemnor while granting additional rights to the condemnee. 80 First,
the Act added “[p]olicies and practices guiding [the] exercise of
eminent domain,” which were enacted with the stated intention to
“encourage and expedite the acquisition of real property by
agreements with owners, to avoid litigation and relieve congestion in
the courts, [and] to assure consistent treatment for property
owners.” 81 The statute largely resembles the federal Uniform
Relocation and Real Policy Acquisition Act of 1970 82 and includes
requirements that “[t]he condemning authority shall make every
reasonable effort to acquire expeditiously real property by
negotiation” 83 and that “[i]n no event shall the condemnor act in bad
faith in order to compel an agreement on the price to be paid for the
property.” 84 The Act also added a statutory provision allowing
condemnees to recover “actual reasonable expenses” in moving. 85
As a direct reaction to the Kelo holding, the Act virtually
eliminates the use of eminent domain for redevelopment by providing
80. Id. at 157–58. The Castle Coalition issued a report grading all fifty states and gave Georgia a
“B+” for its eminent domain reform efforts. CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 14. The report stated,
“Georgia is another state in which 2006 will be remembered as a banner year for the protection of
private property rights.” Id. However, the report’s narrow focus was whether states had made efforts to
protect against Kelo-type public use and stated that the “basic question” of the study was “[h]ow hard is
it now for the government to take a person’s home or business and give it to someone else for private
gain?” Id. at 4. The report did not take into consideration states’ policies on recovery of attorneys’ fees.
Some critics have argued that the Act will ultimately lead to a more extensive condemnation process
resulting in increased costs for all parties. E.g., Fred D. Bentley, Jr., House Bill 1313 Overview,
EMINENT DOMAIN PROGRAM MATERIALS 7 (Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia 2007)
(stating that the bill will affect condemnations by causing “[e]xtensive delays for legal processes in
condemnation proceedings and increased costs for all parties” and that “[m]ore condemnations will
likely result”). The Georgia Municipal Association expressed concerns about Governor Sonny Perdue’s
proposal for eminent domain reform, suggesting that certain provisions “would unduly burden state
courts and overly complicate the redevelopment process by requiring a court hearing on the proposed
use of eminent domain and by limiting its use to a property-by-property basis.” Editorial, OUR
OPINIONS: Property Owners Count; Perdue’s Eminent Domain Plan Rightly Increases Protection for
Residents, Retains Crucial Local Powers, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 10, 2006, at 14A. As part of H.B.
1313, a court must determine “whether the exercise of the power of eminent domain is for a public use
and whether the condemning authority has the legal authority to exercise the power of eminent domain”
in condemnations filed after Feburary 9, 2006 before title can vest with the condemnor. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 22-1-11 (2009).
81. Id. § 22-1-9 (2009).
82. CHRISTIAN F. TORGRIMSON, EMINENT DOMAIN: STATE OF GEORGIA 13 (AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4651–4655).
83. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-9(1) (1982 & Supp. 2010).
84. Id. § 22-1-9(7).
85. Id. § 22-1-13(1).
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that an agency’s condemnation power can only be exercised for
“public use.” 86 Public use is restricted to instances where the public
will generally have the right to use the acquired property such as with
roads or utilities. 87 Exercise of the eminent domain power is
expressly forbidden for “the public benefit of economic
development.” 88 Additionally, the Act repealed Georgia Code section
36-42-8, allowing downtown development authorities to use the
power of eminent domain. 89
2. Georgia’s Condemnation Process
Condemnors 90 in Georgia begin the process of eminent domain
through the Special Master method, 91 the Declaration of Taking
method, 92 or the Assessor method. 93 Although the three methods
follow different procedures, the basic process underlying each is
similar. 94 In each method, the condemnor must provide the
86. Id. § 22-1-2 (“[N]either this state nor any political subdivision thereof nor any other condemning
authority shall use eminent domain unless it is for public use. Public use is a matter of law to be
determined by the court and the condemnor bears the burden of proof.”).
87. Id. § 22-1-1(9)(A). Public use is defined to mean:
(i) The possession, occupation, or use of the land by the general public or by state or local
governmental entities; (ii) The use of land for the creation or functioning of public
utilities; (iii) The opening of roads, the construction of defenses, or the providing of
channels of trade or travel; (iv) The acquisition of property where title is clouded due to
the inability to identify or locate all owners of the property; (v) The acquisition of
property where unanimous consent is received from each person with a legal claim that
has been identified and found; or (vi) The remedy of blight.
Id.
88. Id. § 22-1-1(9)(B).
89. TORGRIMSON, supra note 82, at 14.
90. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-1(3) defines “condemnor” to include public utilities, the State of
Georgia, counties and municipalities, and other political subdivisions. School boards and the Georgia
Department of Transportation also have the power of eminent domain. GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 20-2-521,
32-3-1 (1982 & Supp. 2010).
91. TORGRIMSON, supra note 82, at 3 (citing GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22-2-101 to -114).
92. Id. at 5 (citing GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22-3-140, 32-3-4 to -7, -12, -14, -16, -36(b)). The declaration
of taking method allows municipalities, counties, and the Department of Transportation to acquire
property for roads and highways and provides for a “quick take” procedure whereby the title of the
property is immediately transferred to the condemning authority. See Andrea Cantrell Jones, Assessor
Hearings, in EMINENT DOMAIN SECTION SEMINAR PROGRAM MATERIALS 097032, 1 (Institute of
Continuing Legal Education in Georgia, 2009) (“The most common condemnation procedure I see is the
acquisition of property by a declaration of taking.”).
93. TORGRIMSON, supra note 82, at 6 (citing GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22-1-6, -7, 22-2-26, -40–42, -62,
-65, -80–81).
94. See DANIEL F. HINKEL, GEORGIA EMINENT DOMAIN 6 (2000 ed.); Jones, supra note 92, at 1.
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condemnee with a notice of the condemenation 95 that includes the
facts showing the right to condemn, the persons whose interests will
be affected, and the interests taken. 96
Under the Special Master method, a Special Master appointed by
the judge has the authority to determine just compensation.97
However, property owners may appoint their own assessors to make
determinations in questions of value, and then the condemnors will
appoint their own assessors as well. 98 At the hearing, the property
owners may present witnesses who may testify concerning the
property’s value. 99 The panel then determines the amount of fair
compensation. 100
Though rarely utilized, 101 the Assessor method operates similarly
to the Special Master method. In the Assessor method, the
condemnor chooses an assessor, 102 the condemnee may then choose
an assessor, 103 and then these two assessors together choose a third
assessor. 104 The three assessors then set the value of compensation
based on evidence presented at a hearing. 105
The Declaration of Taking method, by contrast, differs
significantly from the other two methods. Since a Declaration of
Taking involves sewers, gas lines, water or wastewater systems, or
public roads, 106 this procedure provides an expedited process in order
to more quickly get the project underway. In addition to providing

95. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-20. The condemnor must provide notice to “the owner of the property or
of any remainder, reversion, mortgage, lease, security deed, or other interest therein.” Id.
96. Id. § 32-3-5.
97. Zuber Lumber Co. v. City of Atlanta, 227 S.E.2d 362, 367 (Ga. 1976) (holding that “[t]he
primary duty of the Special Master is to ascertain the total amount in money that will be equivalent to
‘just and adequate compensation’ for the property and interests in property being taken by the
condemnor”).
98. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-108.1(A) (1982 & Supp. 2010).
99. GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-9-65 (1995 & Supp. 2010).
100. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-108.1 (1982 & Supp. 2010).
101. TORGRIMSON, supra note 82, at 6 (“Although applicable to most public entities for most public
purposes, the Assessor method of condemnation has universally fallen out of favor with condemnors and
is rarely employed.”).
102. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-26 (2009) (1982 & Supp. 2010).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 22-2-42.
105. Id. § 22-2-63.
106. Id. § 22-3-140.
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notice, the condemnor must file a Declaration of Taking which
includes an appraiser’s estimate of just and adequate
compensation. 107 The condemnee then has sixty days to surrender
possession of the property to the condemnor. 108
In each method, the property owners have the right to challenge the
amount of compensation. However, they must file an appeal in a
timely manner or forfeit the right to appeal. 109 Following a Special
Master or Assessor determination, the property owner has thirteen
days and ten days, respectively, to file a written notice of appeal
requesting a de novo jury trial. 110 The Declaration of Taking method
allows for a thirty-day period to file a notice of appeal following the
declaration of taking requesting a jury trial. 111
C. Georgia Statutes Regarding Attorneys’ Fees
1. Current Eminent Domain Fee-Shifting Statutes
Attorneys’ fees in eminent domain litigation can be recovered in
Georgia where allowed by statute. 112 Statutory allowance of
attorneys’ fees is limited to three distinct situations, all of which were
enacted through the eminent domain legislation of 2006. 113 The Act
codified the recovery of attorneys’ fees where (1) the government
cannot acquire the property through condemnation, 114 (2) the

107. GA. CODE. ANN. § 32-3-6 (2009).
108. Id. § 32-3-12(b) (2009). In a condemnation procedure under any method, compensation must be
paid before title is passed to the condemnor. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Garrett, 267 S.E.2d 643, 645 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1980) (affirming trial court’s ruling of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff where
condemning authority failed to follow several procedural requirements including failure to pay
compensation).
109. Dep’t of Transp. v. Palmer, 263 S.E.2d 514, 516 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (“The trial court does not
have any discretionary right to extend the time for filing an appeal based on dissatisfaction with the
compensation.”).
110. GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22-2-112(a), 22-2-80 (1982 & Supp. 2010). Since a Special Master’s award
is mailed to the property owner, the code was revised in 2006 to allow for three additional days for the
time of mailing. See id.
111. GA. CODE. ANN. § 32-3-14 (2009).
112. Bowers v. Fulton County, 183 S.E.2d 347, 348 (Ga. 1971).
113. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-12 (1982 & Supp. 2010).
114. Id.
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government abandons the condemnation proceeding, 115 or (3) “any
person, family, business, farm operation, or nonprofit organization”
wins against a public entity in an inverse condemnation action. 116
2. The Repeal of the Former Eminent Domain Fee-Shifting Statute
Additionally, the Act adopted the governor’s proposal 117 to repeal
Georgia’s former fee-shifting statute, section 22-2-84.1. 118 The
statute was originally enacted in 1998 in response to “a concern that
private property owners were being ‘low balled’ by condemning
parties, especially the Department of Transportation.” 119 The
legislature structured the statute with a punitive as well as
compensatory element in an attempt to discourage frivolous litigation
while also encouraging just compensation. 120 Specifically, the statute
required a party, either a condemnee or condemnor, who appealed a
Special Master’s award to the superior court to pay the other party’s
“reasonable expenses” if it failed to obtain a judgment changing the
original appeal by at least 20%. 121 Since the ability to recover
attorneys’ fees hinged on which party filed the appeal, the property
115. Id. Property owners can recover attorneys’ fees when “(1) The final judgment is that the
condemning authority cannot acquire the real property by condemnation; or (2) The proceeding is
abandoned by the condemning authority.” Id.
As of March 2011, no appellate decisions interpreting the statute’s application have been
decided. The Georgia Court of Appeals did reference the statute in one case; however, the court found
that the statute was inapplicable since it only applied to condemnations filed after February 9, 2006 and
the condemnation act in question had been filed the year before. Gramm v. City of Stockbridge, 676
S.E.2d 818, 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
116. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-4-8 (1982 & Supp. 2010). The common law already supported this
proposition. See, e.g., Columbia County v. Doolittle, 512 S.E.2d 236, 237 (Ga. 1999) (holding that the
lower court correctly granted attorneys’ fees and costs in an inverse condemnation action where a jury
found that a nuisance amounted to a taking).
117. Perdue Press Release, supra note 77.
118. 2006 Ga. Laws 39, § 6 (repealing GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-84.1).
119. Glen R. Fagan, Eminent Domain Condemnation Procedure Generally: Provide for Award of
Reasonable Expenses in Condemnation Cases; Provide for Substantial Revision of Provisions Relating
to Special Masters in Condemnation Cases; Provide for Special Master Panels; Provide for Powers,
Duties, and Procedures; Change Provisions Relating to Notices and Advertisements Regarding
Acquisition of Property for Transportation Purposes; Changes Provisions Relating to Interlocutory
Hearings Regarding Adequate Compensation, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 115, 116–17 (1998) (providing a
summary of H.B. 155 which made changes to eminent domain law including the addition of GA. CODE.
ANN. § 22-2-84.1).
120. Id. at 119.
121. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-2-84.1 (1982), repealed by 2006 Ga. Laws 39, § 6.
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owner could only recover where the government filed the appeal and
then failed to obtain a judgment of at least 20% over the Special
Master’s award. 122 Thus, the property owner put herself at risk of
having to pay the government’s expenses if she appealed and did not
obtain a high enough judgment, but would be forced to bear her own
litigation costs even if she obtained a judgment greater than the
required increase. 123
In 2005, landowners challenged the statute as unconstitutional,
claiming that it infringed on their constitutional right to recover just
and adequate compensation. 124 The landowners had been dissatisfied
with the Special Master’s award of $6,500 and filed an appeal with
the superior court. 125 There, the jury only awarded them $6,900.
Since this was less than the required 20% increase over the Special
Master’s award, the trial court entered a judgment requiring the
landowners to pay $3,500 of the government’s reasonable attorneys’
fees pursuant to Georgia Code section 22-2-84.1. 126 The supreme
court upheld the statute reasoning that since the ability to appeal a
Special Master’s award is “a matter of legislative grace, and because
a property owner does not have a constitutional right to a trial by jury
on the question of just and adequate compensation,” the statute was
constitutional. 127 Additionally, the court pointed out that several other
states had held that imposing the condemnor’s costs on property
owners did not violate their right to just compensation. 128
122. Id. If the condemnee appealed, he was required to obtain a judgment of at least 20% more, and if
the condemnor appealed, he needed to obtain a reduced judgment of at least twenty percent, for the feeshifting statute to apply. In the case that both parties appealed, neither would be held liable for the other
side’s costs no matter the final judgment. Id.
123. Id.
124. Martin v. Henry County Water & Sewage Auth., 610 S.E.2d 509, 510 (Ga. 2005).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 511.
128. Id. at 511 nn.7, 9. The court cited to cases from Colorado, Minnesota, California, Oklahoma, and
Montana. However, the court did not acknowledge that all of these states have enacted fee-shifting
provisions since those cases were decided, and none of the five states include a punitive element
requiring the landowner to pay the condemnor’s fees. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122(1.5) (2009);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.031 (West 2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 1250.410 (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit.
27 § 11(3) (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-305 (2009). Delaware allows the trial court to require the
landowner to pay the condemnor’s fees, however this is at the judge’s discretion. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
10 § 6111(3) (1999).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss4/14

18

Genteman: Eminent Domain and Attorneys' Fees in Georgia: A Growing State's

2011]

EMINENT DOMAIN AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES

847

Concerned that the statute had “a chilling effect on landowners’
willingness to appeal assessor’s valuation determinations,” Governor
Perdue, in his proposed eminent domain legislation, urged Georgia
Code section 22-2-84.1 be stricken. 129 Although this part of the
Governor’s proposal was adopted and the statute was repealed, his
proposal of adding a new fee-shifting statute that would enable
landowners to recover their attorneys’ fees on appeal was not adopted
as part of the final bill. 130
3. Applicability of General Fee-Shifting Statutes
As in other civil cases, parties in eminent domain proceedings can
recover litigation costs when the other party has brought frivolous
claims and defenses 131 or “acted in bad faith, [is] stubbornly litigious,
or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense.” 132
II. APPROACHES TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN EMINENT DOMAIN
PROCEEDINGS
Only a small minority of states allow for the recovery of attorneys’
fees in condemnation cases as a component of just compensation
under the state constitution. 133 The general rule is that attorneys’ fees
are not recoverable absent statutory authorization. 134 Legislators,
both federally and in many state governments, have provided this
authorization by enacting fee-shifting statutes requiring that a
In 2009 in Clary v. City of Stockbridge, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the trial court
erred in failing to award attorneys’ fees to the City where the landowners had appealed a Special
Master’s award of $609,000 and then only received a $452,000 verdict at trial. Clary v. City of
Stockbridge, 686 S.E.2d 288, 294–95 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). Since the action began before the 2006 repeal
of Georgia Code section 22-2-84.1, the statute applied. The court ruled that “under the plain language”
of the statute the fees are mandatory, and therefore “the condemnees are responsible for the City’s
reasonable expenses incurred during the appeal to the superior court.” Id. at 293.
129. Press Release, Ga. Republican Party, Gov. Perdue Announces Legislation to Protect Private
Property Rights (Feb. 8, 2006).
130. HB 1313, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
131. GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-15-14 (2006).
132. GA. CODE. ANN. § 13-6-11 (2010).
133. 27 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 672 (2008).
134. Id.
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property owner’s litigation expenses be reimbursed in certain
circumstances.
A. Federal Statutes Authorizing Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees in
Eminent Domain Proceedings
In limited circumstances, a property owner may recover litigation
costs in federal eminent domain proceedings when allowed by
statute. 135 The main provisions that entitle a property owner to all
“reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable
attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of
the condemnation proceedings” are much like those in Georgia. 136
Litigation costs are recoverable where a federal government agency
initiates a condemnation action and then abandons the proceeding, 137
a federal court rules that the agency cannot acquire the property
through condemnation, 138 or a property owner successfully sues a
federal agency in an inverse condemnation action. 139 Additionally,
under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 140 an individual property
owner with a net worth under two million dollars 141 who is a
“prevailing party” against a government agency 142 is also entitled to
recover costs including attorneys’ fees 143 where the agency’s
position was not “substantially justified.” 144
135. David S. Black, Recovery of Litigation Fees and Expenses in Federal Condemnation
Proceedings Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 72 APPRAISAL J. 92 (2004).
136. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4654(a) (2006), with GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22-1-12, 22-4-8 (2009); see also
discussion supra Part I.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 4654(a) (2006).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 4654(c).
140. Black, supra note 135 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006)).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 2010). In addition to an individual property owner, “any owner
of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or
organization, the net worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000” is also entitled to recovery. Id.
142. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(H). The statute defines “prevailing party” as one obtaining a final judgment at
trial, “which is at least as close to the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial
on behalf of the property owner as it is to the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested
to at trial on behalf of the Government.” Id.
143. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
144. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B). In order to receive an award of fees and expenses, the party must submit a
report within thirty days of the judgment showing that the criteria of the statute is met and alleging that
the government’s position was not “substantially justified.” Id.
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B. State Approaches to Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees in Eminent
Domain Litigation
Forty years ago, the vast majority of states had no legislation
concerning attorneys’ fees in condemnation cases. 145 Now, many
states provide for recovery of attorneys’ fees for abandonment,
inverse condemnation, or where the government fails to acquire the
property. 146 More importantly, a growing number of states have
enacted statutes either requiring or allowing that landowners be
reimbursed for their litigation costs if they prevail on valuation issues
against the condemnor. 147 The various state approaches providing for
reimbursement of the property owner’s litigation expenses include:
an interpretation by the judiciary requiring reimbursement as part of
the state’s constitutionally-required just compensation; mandatory
statutes requiring an award of expenses where certain conditions are
met; allowing judges to decide where reimbursement is appropriate
based on statutorily defined guidelines; and a statute providing fees
up to a certain dollar limit.
1. Constitutionally Mandated Attorneys’ Fees
Florida has long been known for providing the most generous
recovery scheme of all states. 148 Unlike Georgia, the Florida Supreme
Court has ruled that recovery of attorneys’ fees and litigation costs
are part of the state constitution’s requirement of just

145. Barry L. Friedman, Attorneys’ Fees in Condemnation Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 694, 715
(1969) (noting that at the time, “[o]nly four [American] jurisdictions allow[ed] a condemnee to receive
compensation for his attorneys’ fees in completed condemnation actions,” and two-thirds of states did
not require the government to pay the condemnor’s litigation expenses when the condemnor abandoned
the condemnation).
146. See infra notes 149–91 and accompanying text.
147. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 43, at 890 n.108 (listing eighteen states that had statutes in
2007 awarding full or partial reimbursement of attorneys’ fees in condemnation litigation either based
on the court’s discretion or a requirement that the jury awards exceeds the government’s initial offer by
a specified percentage).
148. See Friedman, supra note 145, at 704–05 (describing Florida’s provisions for attorneys’ fees as
“generous” and “the most liberal found in any state”); Ted Jackovics, Eminent Domain Keeps Losing
Ground, TAMPA TRIB., July 18, 1999, at 1 (“[M]ost observers agree [that Florida laws] are the most
favorable in the nation for landowners.”).
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compensation. 149 In interpreting Florida’s constitutional guarantee of
just compensation, 150 the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that a
private property owner “forced into court by one to whom he owes no
obligation” does not receive just compensation when he must “pay
out of his own pocket the expenses of establishing the fair market
value of the property, which expenses in some cases could
conceivably exceed such value.” 151 The court recognized that the
government’s power and resources often exceed those of the property
owners in condemnation cases and that requiring the government to
pay the property owners’ costs would level the playing field. 152
Early cases interpreting this constitutional mandate allowed
condemnees to recover attorneys’ fees even where they did not
prevail at trial. 153 However, the Florida legislature amended the
statutes relating to attorneys’ fees in 1994 to require that legal fees be
computed according to the difference between the state’s original
offer and the final award to the landowner. 154 Under the statute, “the
court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney’s fees
based solely on the benefits achieved for the client.” 155 The amount
of the “benefits to the client” is based on the difference between the
initial offer made by the condemning authority before the property
owner hires an attorney and the final judgment or settlement. 156 The
court then uses a schedule set forth in the statute to calculate the
149. Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d. 602, 605 (Fla. 1950); see also Jacksonville Expressway
Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. 1958) (“A person who is put to expense
through no desire or fault of his own can only be made whole when his reasonable expenses are included
in compensation.”).
150. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
151. Dade County, 47 So. 2d. at 604–05.
152. Id. at 604.
153. E.g., Hodges v. Dep’t of Transp., 323 So. 2d 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that
attorney’s fees should be awarded where the question of business damages were close, even though the
property owner did not prevail on the issue); City of Miami Beach v. Liflans Corp., 259 So. 2d 515, 516
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that condemnor was required to pay attorneys’ fees even though the
jury awarded no compensation).
154. Jackovics, supra note 148.
155. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2009).
156. The statute defines benefits as “the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment
of settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an
attorney.” Id. § 73.092(1)(a). Additionally, the court may consider nonmonetary benefits that the
attorney obtains for the client where such benefits can be quantified to a reasonable degree of certainty.
Id. § 73.092(1)(b).
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amount of attorneys’ fees. 157 In deciding whether attorneys’ fees are
reasonable, Florida courts look to what the property owner would
likely pay if he were the one responsible for the fees rather than the
government agency. 158 In cases where the property owners
successfully defeat an order of taking, the court must use several
factors to assess a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees. 159 Florida also
allows property owners to recover attorneys’ fees during the
acquisition process, and these are limited by the statute as well. 160
2. Conditional Recovery Based on Percentage of Increase
Several states condition recovery of attorneys’ fees on the
condemnee prevailing at trial. If the jury’s final award of
compensation is greater than the condemnor’s initial offer and the
statute’s requirements are met, then courts must award costs. 161 Some
states, including Montana, 162 Oregon, 163 and Michigan, 164 only
157. Id. § 73.092(1)(c). For example, for any benefit up to $250,000, attorneys’ fees that are up to
33% of that amount may be awarded. Id.
158. Id. § 73.092(3); § 73.091(4). A Florida court found in one condemnation case that $225,000 in
attorney’s fees was reasonable where an experienced condemnation attorney had spent between 2,000
and 3,000 hours on the case, the jury’s verdict was a 300% increase over the condemnor’s original offer,
other attorneys testified as to the reasonableness of the fee, and where the condemnor took no steps to
try to settle prior to trial. Dep’t of Transp. v. Condo. Int’l, 317 So. 2d 811, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
159. Id. § 73.092(2). Some of the relevant factors that the court considers include “[t]he novelty,
difficulty, and importance of the questions involved;” the attorney’s skill; the amount of money
involved; the attorney’s time and labor compared the benefit achieved for the client; and the customary
legal fees of a comparable service. Id.
160. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF RIGHT OF WAY, THE REAL ESTATE
ACQUISITION
PROCESS
6
(2007),
available
at
http://www.dot.state.fl.us/rightofway/documents/AcquisitionHandbookEnglish.pdf. This booklet is
given to property owners when DOT acquisition agents seek to buy their property. The booklet states,
“The department will reimburse you for certain fees and costs you incur during the acquisition process,
primarily for the services of an attorney and/ or appraiser. However, the law places certain limits on this
reimbursement.” Id.; see also OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY,
OPPAGA
PROGRESS
REPORT
2
(Oct.
2001),
available
at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/0146rpt.pdf (“Florida is one of three states that
pay landowner costs during negotiation.”).
161. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 43, at 890 n.108. In 2007, Alaska, California, Florida, Iowa,
Michigan, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin all had statutes awarding full or
partial reimbursement of attorneys’ fees in condemnation litigation based on the requirement the jury
awards exceeds the government’s initial offer by a specified percentage. Id.
162. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-305 (2009).
163. OR. REV. STAT. § 35.346(7) (2007). The statute mandates that the trial court award costs when:
(1) the trial court’s award is greater than the condemnor’s initial written settlement offer, or (2) the court
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require that the condemnee recover an award greater than the offer.
However, the Michigan statute, much like Florida’s benefits-based
rule, limits the award of attorneys’ fees to one-third of the difference
between the agency’s offer and the final judgment. 165
Other states require that the final judgment be a certain percentage
over the offer in order to recover. Alaska, 166 Washington, 167 and
Iowa 168 all require that the final judgment be more than 10% greater
than the condemnor’s offer. South Dakota requires a greater increase
and only awards costs when the final award is at least a 20% more. 169
Colorado has an even more stringent requirement, only mandating
recovery of fees for judgments of a 30% or more increase over the
condemnor’s last written offer. 170 Of the states using this approach,
Minnesota’s 40% increase is the highest requirement. 171 However,
Minnesota employs a hybrid approach by giving the court discretion
to make an award of attorneys’ fees where the difference is at least
20%, but less than 40%. 172
3. Judicial Discretion
In another group of states, landowners who prevail at trial may
recover costs based on the court’s discretion. Similar to the
mandatory provisions, condemnees must often meet certain
finds that the condemnor’s written offer “did not constitute a good faith offer of an amount reasonably
believed by condemner to be just compensation.” Id.
164. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.66(3) (1998).
165. Id.
166. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 72(k)(3). Alaska awards attorneys’ fees where “the award of the court was at
least ten percent (10%) larger than the amount deposited by the condemning authority or the allowance
of the master from which an appeal was taken by the defendant.” Id.
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 8.25.070(1)(b) (2008). The statute mandates that the court award reasonable
attorney and expert fees when the final judgment is at least 10% greater than the agency’s final
settlement offer made thirty days before trial. Id.
168. IOWA CODE § 6B.33 (2008). The acquiring agency must pay all costs where the commissioners’
award “exceeds one hundred ten percent of the final offer of the applicant prior to condemnation.”
Additionally, in appeals, the agency must pay all costs of the appeal unless the final judgment is either
the same or less than the commissioner’s award. Id.
169. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-35-23 (2004). Courts must award expenses where the final judgment
is more than 20% greater than the condemnor’s final offer. Id.
170. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122(1.5) (2007).
171. MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2005).
172. Id.
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requirements before the judge decides whether costs should be
awarded. Louisiana has the most general statute, only requiring that
the highest amount offered from the condemnor is less than the actual
compensation awarded. 173 California awards attorneys’ fees where
the condemnee’s final demand for compensation is deemed
reasonable and the condemnor’s compensation is deemed
unreasonable. 174 Delaware requires that the final award is closer to
the condemnee’s valuation evidence at trial than the condemnor’s
offer, in order for the condemnee to request an award of litigation
expenses. 175 This law cuts both ways and allows the condemnor to
request costs where the final award is lower than the condemnor’s
offer. 176 Regardless, costs are not allowed to exceed the amount of
just compensation awarded. 177
Whereas Oklahoma and Idaho both require that the award of just
compensation exceed a set amount of 10% of the condemning
authority’s offer in order to invoke the discretion of the court, 178 New
York requires that the award be “substantially in excess of the
amount of the condemnor’s proof” and be “deemed necessary by the
court for the condemnee to achieve just and adequate
compensation.” 179 New York courts have held an award of 29% is
“substantially in excess of the initial offer and thus qualif[ies] [the
comdemnee] for reimbursement of fees and costs.” 180 However, an
award of almost 23% has been deemed insubstantial. 181 Generally,
awards over 35% have been deemed to meet the requirement. 182

173. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:8, 19:109 (2004).
174. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.410 (2007).
175. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 6111 (1999). The court may award fees at its discretion, taking into
account whether the condemnee unnecessarily delayed the proceeding, whether the condemnor’s
position was substantially justified, or if there are “special circumstances [that] make an award of
expenses unjust.” Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-711A (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11(3) (1997).
179. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701 (1987).
180. William D. Siegel & Saul R. Fenchel, Reimbursement of Fees, Costs in Eminent Domain Cases,
237 N.Y. L. J. 20 (2007).
181. Id.
182. MICHAEL RIKON, EMINENT DOMAIN: STATE OF NEW YORK, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, at
16.
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Kansas and Nebraska both make recovery of attorneys’ fees
contingent upon which party appeals the initial award. In Kansas, the
judge has discretion to render a judgment of attorneys’ fees whenever
the condemnor files the appeal and then the jury renders a verdict for
the landowner above the appraisers’ award. 183 Nebraska has a more
complex system, allowing the court discretion to award reasonable
attorneys’ fees to the condemnee where: the condemnee appeals and
is awarded a judgment 15% greater than the appraisers’ award; the
condemnor appeals and the final judgment is not less than 85% of the
appraisers’ award; or, both parties appeal and the final judgment is
greater than the appraisers’ award. 184 Where only the condemnee
appeals and does not receive a judgment equal to or greater than the
appraisers’ award, the court may award costs to the condemnor, not
including expert or attorney fees. 185
4. Fee Capping
Pennsylvania takes a unique approach to the recovery of attorneys’
fees in eminent domain litigation. Under its statute, a property owner
in an eminent domain action generally receives reimbursement of
reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees; however, the amount
is capped at $4,000. 186
5. Georgia Compared to Other Southeastern States
Many of the southeastern states, like Georgia, have experienced
above-average growth in recent years. 187 These states generally limit
recovery of attorneys’ fees to the same instances as Georgia and
federal law: when the property owner is successful in an inverse
condemnation action, the government agency fails to acquire the
property, or the government agency abandons the condemnation after
183. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-509 (2000).
184. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-720 (2009).
185. Id.
186. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 710 (2009).
187. GEORGIA IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 25, at 9. Between 2000 and 2007, Florida, Tennessee,
South Carolina, and North Carolina all had population growth rates which were above the national
average. Alabama and Mississippi’s growth rates, however, were below the national average. Id.
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the action has commenced. This is the case in Alabama, 188
Mississippi,189 North Carolina, 190 and Virginia. 191
In addition to providing for the recovery of attorneys’ fees in the
above mentioned scenarios, South Carolina also follows the judicial
discretion approach and statutorily provides that “[a] landowner who
prevails in the trial of a condemnation action, in addition to his
compensation for the property, may recover his reasonable litigation
expenses,” subject to the judge’s discretion. 192 This provision does
not apply to settlements and defines “prevails” to mean the
compensation awarded “is at least as close to the highest valuation of
the property that is attested to at trial on behalf of the landowner as it
is to the highest valuation of the property that is attested to at trial on
behalf of the condemnor.” 193
188. In White v. State, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that attorneys’ fees and expert witness fees
were not part of “just compensation” in eminent domain actions. 319 So. 2d 247, 247 (Ala. 1975).
Alabama Code section 18-1A-232 provides for litigation expenses where an action is dismissed by the
plaintiff or the court determines that the condemning authority cannot acquire the property. This code
section mandates the inclusion of a property owner’s litigation expenses as part of a plaintiff’s
compensation in an inverse condemnation proceeding. ALA. CODE § 18-1A-232 (2009). Additionally,
Alabama Code section 18-1A-95 provides that attorneys’ fees in a direct condemnation act are
recoverable where the condemning agency lacks the authority to condemn the property. ALA. CODE
§ 18-1A-95 (2009).
189. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-37-9 (2009) provides for the recovery of litigation expenses including
attorneys’ fees in inverse condemnation actions. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-27-37 (2009) provides
attorneys’ fees to property owners where “the plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment condemning the
property” or if the plaintiff dismisses the suit. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held in Maples v.
Mississippi State Highway Commission that litigation expenses are not recoverable by a defendant in an
eminent domain proceeding as part of just compensation. 617 So. 2d 265, 271 (Miss. 1993).
190. In Department of Transportation v. Winston Container Co., the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina held that the landowner’s litigation expenses and costs are not considered part of just
compensation. 263 S.E.2d 830, 831 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). By statute, judges have the discretion to
award attorneys’ fees if the condemnor abandons the action, if the court issues a final judgment denying
the condemnation, or in an inverse condemnation action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-8 (2009).
191. A state agency must reimburse a property owner for reasonable costs, including reasonable
attorneys’ fees where the owner obtains a final judgment that the agency cannot acquire the property or
the agency abandons the action. VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-419 (2003). Attorneys’ fees are also recoverable
where a plaintiff receives just compensation in an inverse condemnation proceeding. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-187 (2001).
192. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-510(B)(1) (2007). The court has the discretion to reduce the amount of
the award, or even deny the award, upon a finding that the landowner “engaged in conduct which unduly
and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action,” the condemnor’s position was
“substantially justified,” or that “special circumstances make an award unjust.” Id.
193. Id. § 28-2-510(B)(2). The requirements of the statute are illustrated in City of Folly Beach v.
Atlantic House Properties, Ltd. There, the landowner stipulated at trial that the value of its property was
$642,500, whereas the city stipulated that it was worth $31,000. The compensation awarded by the jury
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An outlier, Tennessee does not allow recovery of attorneys’ fees in
these situations and is especially harsh in requiring that if a party
appeals the finding of a jury of inquest and the jury verdict at trial
either affirms the ruling or makes a less favorable finding, then the
appellant must pay court costs. 194
6. Evaluation of State Approaches
Although the Southern states may be slow in adopting fee-shifting
provisions, the general trend in recent years has been a recognition by
many states that fee-shifting statutes, whether mandatory or
discretionary, are necessary in eminent domain litigation in order to
make landowners whole. Florida’s approach 195 of providing
reimbursement of attorneys’ fees as part of constitutionally
guaranteed just compensation offers the strongest protection for
landowners since this right can only be overturned by the Florida
Supreme Court or an amendment to the Florida Constitution.
However, because many states, including Georgia, follow the general
rule that attorneys’ fees are a matter of legislative grace rather than
constitutional command, they would not adopt this aspect of Florida’s
approach. Nevertheless, Florida’s benefits based statute could be
incorporated by many states and would provide a bright-line rule for
recovery while encouraging meritorious claims by only allowing the
recovery of litigation expenses on the amount of the benefit that the
attorney gains for the property owner.
The conditional mandatory provisions, which provide
reimbursement when a landowner gains a specified increase on
appeal, also provide a bright-line rule. However, these statutes are
was $250,000. The court found that the landowner did not prevail because the difference ($392,500)
between the value that he offered at trial ($642,500) and the compensation that was awarded to him
($250,000) was greater than the difference ($219,000) between the value that the City offered at trial
($31,000) and the awarded compensation ($250,000). City of Folly Beach v. Atl. House Props., Ltd.,
467 S.E.2d 928, 929 (S.C. 1996).
194. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-119 (2002). “If the verdict of the jury, upon the trial, affirms the
finding of the jury of inquest, or is more unfavorable to the appellant than the finding of such jury, the
costs shall be adjudged against such appellant; otherwise the court may award costs as in chancery
cases.” Id.
195. See supra notes 148–60 and accompanying text.
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based on arbitrary percentages and allow little flexibility. Alternately,
the purely judicial discretion approach offers flexibility but fails to
provide a bright-line rule, which is crucial to accomplishing a feeshifting statute’s dual purposes of providing a check on the
government so that more fair offers are made from the outset and
making property owners whole when they must litigate to receive fair
compensation. 196 Finally, though mandatory, a statute that caps fees
at a low amount, such as Pennsylvania’s statute, 197 would not be
substantially different from no provision at all, since the award would
be so limited that none of the statute’s goals would be accomplished.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR A FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE IN GEORGIA
Both the Georgia Supreme Court and the General Assembly have
acknowledged the need for a statute authorizing the recovery of
attorneys’ fees in eminent domain actions in Georgia. 198 Of the
various statutory approaches, Georgia should adopt a fee-shifting
statute much like Florida’s benefits based statute, 199 while also
incorporating an element of judicial discretion.
A. Georgia’s Current Statute
Since the repeal of Georgia’s former fee-shifting statute, Georgia
Code section 22-2-84.1, Georgia landowners no longer face the fear
that they may have to pay the government’s expenses on appeal.
However, by repealing the entire statute and failing to enact an
alternative, the legislature has put Georgia landowners largely in the
same position that they were in prior to the enactment of the statute.
Despite the significant reform in 2006 adding procedural protections
for property owners, condemnees still need the procedural protection
of a statute that will require a condemning authority to pay the

196.
197.
198.
199.
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landowner’s attorneys’ fees in the event that the landowner is forced
to litigate in order to recover just compensation.
B. Justifications for a Fee-Shifting Statute
Two primary justifications exist for enacting a fee-shifting statute
reimbursing property owners for their litigation expenses in eminent
domain litigation. First, because of the uniqueness of the eminent
domain process, a statute requiring that the government must pay the
landowner’s attorneys’ fees in the event that the landowner must go
to court to receive just compensation encourages the government to
make more fair offers from the outset. A fee-shifting statute provides
a check on the government’s negotiations in the acquisition process.
Second, reimbursing a property owner who must litigate and incur
expenses in order to receive just compensation is fundamentally fair
because it makes the property owner whole.
1. Preserving Checks and Balances
Government appraisers have often been criticized for “low-ball”
offers. 200 News reports abound with stories of owners receiving an
offer for significantly less than the value actually awarded when the
case is litigated. 201 Although critics have argued that such cases
represent extreme and gross exaggerations of the norm, 202 few studies
200. E.g., Fagan supra note 119, at 116–17 (Georgia Code section 22-2-84.1 was originally enacted to
combat perceived lowball offers by the Georgia DOT); Dustin Block, The Price of Progress: Wisconsin
Department of Transportation and Eminent Domain, THE DAILY REP., Apr. 10, 2009 (“Lawyers argue
that their ability to challenge WisDOT at all proves the agency lowballs property owners.”).
201. See, e.g., Block, supra note 200 (reporting case where the Wisconsin DOT offered a property
owner $300,000 for a piece of land, the property owner appealed, and then the DOT settled with the
owner for $1.6 million); Robin Fields, Eminent Domain: It’s the Brigham Family Way, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), June 22, 1998, at 12A (reporting case where the state offered a condemnee $25
million for almost 600 acres of beachfront property, the state refused a counteroffer of $45 million, and
then the condemnee won a settlement of $84 million); Charlie Frago, Eminent-Domain Proposal
Falters: Measure Deals with Making State Pay Some Attorneys, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Apr. 2,
2009 (reporting case of an attorney who paid $400,000 for billboards that were condemned only three
years later, was offered $50,000 for them by the DOT, and eventually received $150,000 after litigating
his case).
202. E.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 101, 105 (2006) (“Not only are Takers legally obligated to attempt to negotiate a voluntary
purchase before resorting to a formal eminent domain proceeding, but they operate under legal and
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have been conducted concerning whether a condemning agency’s
offer routinely falls below the fair market value.
A study of over 2,000 condemned parcels in New York in the
1960s known as the “Nassau Study” 203 is often cited by scholars
discussing just compensation. 204 Nassau County, which at the time of
the study included parts of Long Island, Queens, and Kings, New
York, was one of the fastest growing areas in the country at the time
of the study. 205 After analyzing 110 acquisitions occurring in a fouryear period, 206 the study concluded that “gross underpayment can
now be substantiated” in Nassau County. 207 The study further
expressed that “the practices and attitudes of Nassau County, as we
have reported them, may indeed typify those of condemnors
elsewhere.” 208
A more recent study examining 207 transactions of single-family
homes during the construction of a California state highway between
April and October of 1991 argues the opposite. 209 This study

financial incentives that strongly encourage them to succeed. As a result, they may offer property
owners more than market value for their property in order to avoid costly eminent domain
proceedings.”).
203. Curtis J. Berger & Patrick J. Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look Into the
Practices of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1967).
204. See Gideon Kanner, Do We Need to Impair or Strengthen Property Rights in Order to “Fulfill
Their Unique Role?” A Response to Professor Dyal-Chand, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 423, 444 n.87 (2009)
(citing to a plethora of law review articles that have discussed the Nassau Study including the following:
W. Harold Bigham, “Fair Market Value,” “Just Compensation” and the Constitution: A Critical View,
24 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1970); Nathan Burdsell, Just Compensation and the Seller’s Paradox, 20 BYU J.
PUB. L. 79, 82 (2005); Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46
S.C. L. REV. 579 (1995); James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277 (1985); Frank A. Aloi & Arthur Abba Goldberg, A Reexamination of
Value, Good Will, and Business Losses in Eminent Domain, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 604, 647 (1968);
Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
765, 770–87 (1973); Frank S. Sengstock & John W. McAuliffe, What Is the Price of Eminent Domain?
An Introduction to the Problems of Valuation in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 44 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 185, 191 (1966); Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the
Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1991); Michael Risinger, Direct Damages: The Lost
Key to Constitutional Just Compensation When Business Premises are Condemned, 15 SETON HALL L.
REV. 483 (1985)).
205. Berger & Rohan, supra note 203, at 432.
206. Id. at 434.
207. Id. at 457.
208. Id. at 458.
209. Krisandra Guidry & A. Quang Do, Eminent Domain and Just Compensation for Single-Family
Homes, 66 APPRAISAL J. 231 (1998).
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concluded that the owners were not undercompensated but instead
had received a premium of 4.7% for their properties. 210 Only five
pages long, the study offered no explanation for the types of takings
involved. The study seemed to analyze only instances where the
entire property was taken and then compared the negotiated prices to
the fair market values which were determined by examining the
homes’ various features such as number of bathrooms, view, square
footage, age, and number of garages. 211 If this is the case, the study
fails to consider cases of easements or partial takings. In both of these
scenarios, which are common when properties are taken for roads, the
fair market value is more difficult to calculate because consequential
damages must be taken into consideration. 212
Following the Court’s decision in Kelo, Congress mandated that
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct “a nationwide
study on the use of eminent domain by state and local
governments.” 213 Like much of the eminent domain reports following
Kelo, the report mainly focused on the purposes for which eminent
domain can be used. 214 However, the report also examined the
acquisition process used by states. 215 In doing so, the GAO met with
multiple property owners and property rights groups. 216 The GAO
found that these groups believe that condemnors often make belowmarket offers and that property owners cannot afford to litigate to
obtain additional compensation because the court costs are too
high. 217
Data gained from Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT)
records indicates that these property rights groups’ arguments may
have merit and that Georgia property owners may not receive just
210. Id.
211. See id. at 233.
212. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text for an example of consequential damages in a road
project condemnation.
213. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-28, EMINENT DOMAIN: INFORMATION ABOUT
ITS USES AND EFFECT ON PROPERTY OWNERS AND COMMUNITIES IS LIMITED (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0728.pdf.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 30.
217. Id. at 35–36.
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compensation for DOT takings. 218 The concern that the DOT was
making lowball offers to Georgia property owners prompted the
General Assembly in 1998 to enact a fee-shifting statute. 219 Because
this practice likely continues, this concern should again prompt the
legislature to act. Many condemnations by the DOT are carried out
through the Declaration of Taking method, meaning that the appraiser
pays in the amount of just compensation to the court and then the
condemnee has the opportunity to appeal. 220 Of those condemnees
that appeal their awards, many reach a legal settlement and never
actually go to a jury trial. 221 In the case of legal settlements, as well
as with jury trials, the final amount usually far exceeds the pay-in
amount. 222 If the final settlement amount or jury award represents the
actual fair market value, then the pay-in amounts often fall well
below fair market value. This could indicate that the DOT is not
offering adequate compensation, and the owner must fight the
appraiser’s determination in order to receive just compensation.
However, a comparison of the number of acquisitions by deed to
condemnations via eminent domain shows that most people are able
to negotiate a suitable price with the DOT and condemnation is
usually not necessary. 223 This data could be construed as showing
218. See GDOT Memorandum, supra note 27. The author makes no claims that any conclusions
drawn are the result of thorough statistical analysis. This Note reports raw numbers as supplied by the
DOT and attempts to evaluate those numbers as evidence in trends in acquisitions in Georgia.
219. Fagan, supra note 119, at 116–17.
220. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-3-6(b) (2009).
221. GDOT Memorandum, supra note 27. Of the 169 condemnations in 2000, 60 resulted in legal
settlements and only eight went to jury trials. Id. In 2005, 120 condemnations resulted in legal
settlements with only 13 going to jury trials. Id.
222. Id. In 2000, the final award in eight jury trials ranged from 10% to 757% greater than the pay-in
amount. Of thirteen jury trials in 2005, final judgments ranged from 32% to almost 10,000% increases
over the pay-in amount. In 2006, awards ranged from 16% to almost a 5,000% increase. Id. Settlements
also show disparities, sometimes very large, between the pay in amount and the final award. Of the
forty-three listed settlements in 2000 that contained data for both pay-in amounts and final awards,
twenty-two showed a 100% increase or greater in the pay-in amount. Id. An additional eight had
increases between 50% and 99% increases. Id. In 2005, of the 108 settlements with available data, fortynine resulted in final settlements over 100% greater than the pay-in amount and twenty-four settlements
were in the 50% to 99% increase range. Id.
223. Id.
Breakdown of Georgia Acquisitions in Four Selected Years
Year
2000
2005
2006
2007
Acquisition by deed
1,715
2,307
3,226
2,948
Acquisition by Eminent Domain
169
201
409
372
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that the DOT offers a fair price from the outset, thus alleviating the
necessity of eminent domain. However, another possible explanation
is that property owners accept these offers because they lack either
the resources or the knowledge to challenge the government’s
offer. 224 Confronted with the possibility of hundreds, and often
thousands, of dollars in litigation expenses, property owners make the
economical choice of accepting the government’s offer. 225 Quite
often, the potential for recovery is outweighed by these possible
costs. 226 Since eminent domain attorneys in Georgia often work on a
contingent fee basis, they are simply unable to take on cases unless
there is a large enough potential recovery. 227
A chief acquisition officer in Minnesota said the following to
landowners whose property was being acquired for a state park
project in that state: 228

224. Kanner, supra note 44, at 1105 (2007) (arguing that property owners often accept offers despite
their inadequacy because the property owners “lack the knowledge and funds necessary to ascertain true
value and mount an effective legal defense” or “the economic stakes do not justify litigation because
probable increases over and above the condemnor’s initial offer may be close to or less than the
unrecoverable cost of litigation”).
225. Friedman, supra note 145, at 696. Friedman explains the landowner’s inferior bargain power:
[F]ollowing the announcement of the condemnor’s intent to condemn and the initial offer
to purchase, the condemnee will be prejudiced during any subsequent negotiations due to
a fear of incurring substantial litigation expenses in the event that he and the condemnor
are unable to reach a settlement. It is this fear that compels many landowners to settle out
of court for less than just compensation: they wish to avoid what may be a greater loss
occasioned by a jury award of the fair market value, from which is to be deducted the
costs of the litigation.
Id.
226. In commenting on Arkansas’ proposed legislation which would require the condemnor to pay
attorneys’ fees where a final award exceeds the state’s offer by ten percent or more, Republican Andrea
Lea expressed fear “that many people wouldn’t know enough to find an attorney who worked on
contingency and wouldn’t have enough money to fight the state. ‘How many people just throw in the
towel?’ she asked.” Frago, supra note 201; see also Marie Price, Lawmakers Rethink Attorney Fees for
Eminent Domain Deals, JOURNAL-RECORD (Okla.), Dec. 16, 1999 (quoting attorney Kim Ritchie as
saying, in regard to the debate over an attorneys’ fee statute in Oklahoma, “[Landowners] could cave in
because they think they can’t fight the state”).
227. See Kanner, supra note 44, at 1105 (“The consensus among condemnation lawyers is that, unless
the ‘spread’ between the condemnor’s offer and the property’s demonstrable value is on the order of
$75,000 to $100,000, litigation is not economically feasible.”); see also Dustin Block, Attorney Rallies
Opposition to Wisconsin Department of Transportation Rule, DAILY REP., Mar. 23, 2009 (quoting a
Wisconsin eminent domain attorney as saying that if Wisconsin sets a cap on attorneys’ fees, which are
currently recoverable under statute, “[c]ases where the state wants to take 10 to 20 acres from a farmer
would not be economical to pursue”).
228. See Althaus v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 688, 691–92 (1985).
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Even though we know what your lands are worth, we are going
to try and get them for 30 cents on every dollar that we feel they
are worth. Of course, you don’t have to accept this 30 cents on
the dollar. . . . After a couple of years if you won't take 30 cents
on the dollar, we are going to condemn it. We will condemn your
property. You know what that is going to mean? That means that
you are going to have to hire an expensive lawyer from the city
and he is going to take one-third of what you get. Plus, you know
who is going to have to pay the court costs. You are. That is in
addition to these expensive lawyers. 229

The officer’s unvarnished remarks illustrate the government’s
awareness of its supreme bargaining power in a situation where legal
redress is often an uneconomical choice for the condemnee. Although
many acquisition agents are likely wise enough not to make such a
blatant declaration of disregard for a property owner’s rights, such a
mindset potentially exists where the condemnor knows that a legal
battle is simply not feasible for the landowner. 230
Acquisition agents in Georgia are undoubtedly aware that property
owners will not be able to afford to litigate in many cases. Although
Georgia’s statutes require that acquisition agents “make every
reasonable effort to acquire expeditiously real property by
negotiation” 231 and forbid agents from acting in “bad faith,”232
without the threat of a challenge to their offers, an important check
on excessive government power is missing. A fee-shifting statute
would encourage more fair offers from the outset, while also
encouraging the government to settle prior to trial. 233 This is because

229. Id.
230. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 43, at 887 (noting that “[p]rivate property rights activists
allege that the undercompensation problem is further exacerbated by the government’s superior
bargaining position in its negotiations with owners”).
231. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-9(1) (1982 & Supp. 2010).
232. Id. § 22-1-9(7).
233. Garnett, supra note 202, at 130 (“[F]ee-shifting statutes penalize the government for
unreasonably refusing to settle prior to trial.”).
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the condemnor must take into account not only the possibility of his
own legal expenses, but those of the condemnee as well. 234
Critics of fee-shifting statutes may argue that a system like
Florida’s provides its citizens with this procedural safeguard, and yet
eminent domain litigation persists in Florida. For example, in one
case, an elderly couple’s retirement was suddenly jeopardized when
they received a check for a mere $109,750 for the apartment building
they purchased upon moving to Florida. 235 After learning that a
neighbor had received twice as much, the couple engaged in a threeyear-legal-battle that produced a jury award of $305,000 plus
interest. 236 In yet another case, a K-mart store received a $3.2 million
verdict at trial after challenging the state’s offer of $158,000. 237 The
trial court judge opined that the DOT had “prolong[ed], at the
taxpayers’ expense, as well as at the expense of judicial economy,
what should have been a normal eminent domain case.” 238 These
examples show that the procedural protections implemented by the
state sometimes fail. Although Georgia added significant protections
for property owners with its eminent domain legislation in 2006,239
the system does not always work perfectly in practice. Checks,
therefore, should be instituted to make sure that procedures are
followed. However, when the system fails and property owners must
litigate in order to be made whole, they should be compensated for
the expenses they incur.
2. Fundamental Fairness
In an eminent domain case decided at the end of the Great
Depression, Justice Douglas announced, “The law of eminent domain
234. Florida’s DOT manual requires that when evaluating a potential settlement, the anticipated costs
of litigation including the landowner’s attorneys’ fees must be taken into consideration. See STATE OF
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RIGHT OF WAY MANUAL, ADMINISTRATIVE
SETTLEMENTS 2–4
(2009), available at
http://www.dot.state.fl.us/rightofway/documents/
ROWmanual/guide6.pdf.
235. Jackovics, supra note 148.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See supra notes 76–89 and accompanying text.
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is fashioned out of the conflict between the people’s interest in public
projects and the principle of indemnity to the landowner.” 240 As
Georgia faces the growing pains of rapid expansion in a time of
severely constrained budgets and an economic downturn, Justice
Douglas’s characterization of this inherent tension in eminent domain
law rings true now more than ever. Georgia undoubtedly has a need
to create the public infrastructure to support its growing population
while also protecting a private property owner’s right to just
compensation. 241
Many courts have recognized that indemnity requires property
owners to be made whole and those who must litigate to receive just
compensation for their property are not made whole. 242 Inevitably,
any recovery that the landowner receives is reduced by the amount
that she must spend to obtain that recovery, effectually penalizing the
landowner the amount of her litigation expenses. 243 Once the
property owner deducts the costs of mounting her legal defense, she
is left with an amount below just compensation. Fundamental fairness
therefore requires that society as a whole should bear the burden of
litigation costs rather than the individual. 244
A common concern is that such fee-shifting provisions in the
eminent domain context will lead to increased costs of land
240. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943).
241. See discussion supra Introduction.
242. E.g., Lehigh Clay Prods., Ltd. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 545 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Iowa 1996)
(explaining that the purpose Iowa’s fee-shifting statute is “to more nearly make whole those property
owners whose lands are taken by eminent domain and who must litigate in the courts in order to obtain a
proper determination of their just compensation;” otherwise, if property owners are “required to pay
their own attorney fees, much of the benefit that might be gained by a successful appeal would be offset
by the resulting legal costs”); Meyers v. State, 634 N.Y.S.2d. 642, 645 (Ct. Cl. 1995) (“The purpose of
[New York’s fee-shifting statute] is neither to chill nor encourage attorney advocacy,” but it is intended
“to permit an additional, discretionary allowance to ameliorate expenses which might otherwise
diminish an appropriation award to something less than just compensation.”); Dade County v. Brigham,
47 So. 2d 602, 605 (Fla. 1950); Friedman, supra note 145, at 703 (citing City & County of San
Francisco v. Collins, 33 P. 56, 57 (Cal. 1893) (requiring the defendants to pay trial costs for themselves
or the condemnor “would reduce the just compensation awarded by the jury, by a sum equal to that paid
by them for such costs”).
243. Friedman, supra note 145, at 697.
244. In commenting on Illinois’s proposed statute in 2006 for reimbursement of attorney fees, John
Bradley, a sponsor of the bill, put it well when saying, “It’s a philosophical decision we have to
make . . . [w]here does the pendulum land? In my view, it lands with the private property owner.” Philip
Ewing, House OKs Curbs on Eminent Domain, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 20, 2006, at A1.
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acquisition. 245 In its annual report on rights of way and surveys, the
Minnesota DOT commented, “We are beginning to see some of the
effects of the eminent domain legislation passed by the Legislature in
2006. Payments for attorney fees and costs are beginning to rise.” 246
Increases in land acquisition costs are inevitable if the statute works
as intended. A fee-shifting statute theoretically forces acquisition
agents to make fair offers from the outset, which in turn increases
land acquisition costs. If offers are not increased to the fair market
value, then the statute causes an increase in costs to the state when it
must pay the condemnee’s expenses for litigating to receive his fair
compensation. Either way, costs will rise when a fee-shifting statute
is implemented. However, just like the payment of relocation
expenses that Georgia added in 2006, 247 which will obviously result
in greater acquisition costs to the state, legislative grace provides for
the reimbursement of these costs and is necessary to ensure that
property owners are made whole.
C. Proposed Fee-Shifting Statute
Reimbursement of Owner’s Attorneys’ Fees in Eminent Domain
Actions
(1) In all eminent domain actions, the court shall award
attorneys’ fees to the property owner based on the benefits
achieved for the client.
(a) As used in this section, the term “benefits” means the
difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment

245. Id. Opponents of the then proposed attorney fee reimbursement statute in Illinois said, “the new
legal hurdle could slow or stop economic revitalization.” Id.; see also Price, supra note 226 (“Having to
pay landowners’ attorney fees in some eminent domain cases for acquiring highway rights-of-way adds
substantially to the costs of road projects.”); Bill Moss, Lawyers Target Two Who Pushed Fee Cuts, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Oct. 9, 1992, at 1B (“‘The expensive process of acquiring the land—not the
land itself—is what has driven the cost skyward, critics say’ regarding Florida’s ‘spiraling cost of right
of way for highway projects.’”).
246. STATEWIDE ANNUAL REPORT: RIGHT OF WAY AND SURVEYS FISCAL YEAR 2009, MINNESOTA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 12 (2009), available at http://www.olmweb.dot.state.mn.us/reports/
Annualreports/AnnualReportFY2009.pdf.
247. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-13 (1982 & Supp. 2010).
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or settlement and the last written offer by the acquisition
agent prior to condemning the property.
(b) The court may also consider nonmonetary benefits
obtained for the client through the efforts of the attorney, to
the extent such nonmonetary benefits are specifically
identified by the court and can, within a reasonable degree
of certainty, be quantified.
(c) Attorneys’ fees based on benefits achieved shall be
awarded in accordance with the following schedule:
1. Thirty-three percent of any benefit up to $250,000;
plus
2. Twenty-five percent of any portion of the benefit
between $250,000 and $1 million; plus
3. Twenty percent of any portion of the benefit
exceeding $1 million.
(2) Attorneys’ fees as defined under this section shall include all
reasonable costs that are necessary to litigate the action.
(3) In determining whether the attorneys’ fees to be paid by the
petitioner under subsection (1) are reasonable under subsection
(2), the court shall be guided by the fees the defendant would
ordinarily be expected to pay for these services if the petitioner
was not responsible for the payment of those fees.
(4) At least 30 days prior to a hearing to assess attorneys’ fees
under subsection (1), the condemnee’s attorney shall submit to
the condemning authority and to the court the complete time
records and a detailed statement of services rendered by date,
nature of the services performed, time spent performing such
services, and costs incurred.
(5) The condemnee shall provide to the court a copy of any fee
arrangement that may exist between the defendant and his or her
attorney, and the court must reduce the amount of attorneys’ fees
to be paid by the defendant by the amount of any attorneys’ fees
awarded by the court.
(6) The trial court may at its discretion deny or reduce any
recovery under section (1) if it finds that in light of the evidence
admitted at trial and the compensation awarded that:
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(a) the condemnee unnecessarily delayed the proceeding;
(b) the condemnee’s position was substantially unjustified;
or
(c) special circumstances exist that make an award of
expenses unjust.

This proposed statute represents a combination of Florida’s 248 and
Delaware’s 249 eminent domain fee-shifting statutes with some
alterations. Recovery of attorneys’ fees for the landowner is
mandatory as in Florida; however, much like Delaware’s statute, the
trial judge retains the discretion to limit the award of fees when she
finds that the condemnee unnecessarily delayed the proceeding, his
position was substantially unjustified, or special circumstances would
make an award of fees unjust. This built-in element of discretion
would further deter frivolous or unjustified litigation.
A mandatory provision with a discretionary element is superior to
a pure discretionary provision because it provides a bright-line rule.
If property owners, as well as condemnors, are unsure whether
property owners will be able to recover under the statute, then part of
the statute’s purpose is defeated. The statute cannot provide a
necessary check on government unless all parties are assured of the
landowner’s right to recovery. Without mandatory provisions the
landowner will still be deterred from litigating meritorious claims.
However, the amount that the government will have to pay must be
enough to deter inadequate offers.
For the mandatory portion of the statute, Florida represents the best
statute for Georgia to replicate for several reasons. Florida has one of
the oldest fee-shifting provisions in the nation dating back nearly
sixty years. 250 Over this time span Florida has been able to evaluate
the effects of this provision and fine tune its statutes. In 1994, the
Florida Legislature enacted its current benefit-based statute in

248. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2009).
249. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 6111(3) (2009).
250. Florida established that landowners are entitled to attorneys’ fees in eminent domain actions in
1950. Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 605 (Fla. 1950).
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reaction to escalating right of way costs. 251 Unlike other conditional
statutes that require the final award be a set percentage of increase in
order for the landowner to recover, 252 Florida adopted a statute that
conditions the award of attorneys’ fees on the dollar amount of
increase that the attorney is able to obtain for his client. 253 Whereas a
strict percentage based statute arbitrarily sets a number that seems
like it will be effective in deterring claims without substantial merit,
Florida’s statute bases recovery on the amount of increase the
attorney gained for the client and then allows a portion of that
benefit, which reflects a contingent fee schedule, to be recovered. 254
Florida found that following the enactment of this statute, land
acquisition costs associated with attorneys’ fees decreased without
stifling litigation altogether. 255
This statute represents a compromise between making land
acquisition cost prohibitive versus making litigation for landowners
cost prohibitive. Unlike with statutes that only require the landowner
to gain a judgment above the government’s initial offer, litigation still
might not feasible in very low value cases. 256 However, on the whole,
the statute will provide most landowners with an important
procedural safeguard, while also taking into account taxpayer
concerns by not over-incentivizing litigation.
Contrary to the Florida statute, which allows for the recovery of
attorneys’ fees in the acquisition process, 257 the proposed statute
would limit the recovery of attorneys’ fees to condemnations. The
251. OFF. OF PROGRAM POL’Y ANALYSIS AND GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT 99-02,
JUSTIFICATION REVIEW RIGHT-OF-WAY ACQUISITION PROGRAM FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
11
(1999),
available
at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/
Reports/pdf/9902rpt.pdf.
252. See supra notes 160–71 and accompanying text.
253. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2009).
254. Id.
255. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 160,
at 3.
256. See Block, supra note 227 for an example of this situation. Louis Prange, a Wisconsin dairy
breeder, was offered $14,000 by the Wisconsin DOT for land it needed to rebuild a highway. After three
years of litigation, he won a $28,000 verdict. Prange’s legal fees exceeded the actual settlement amount,
but the state was forced to pay Prange’s attorneys’ fees. Under a proposed law in Wisconsin to use a
benefits-based approach, Prange’s fees would be limited to one-third the benefit achieved, equal to
$4,700, making litigation cost-prohibitive for a landowner in a similar position to Prange. Id.
257. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (2009).
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justification for this difference is that prior to the condemnation, the
government has not acted upon the property owner. During the
negotiation phase, the property owner and condemning authority
attempt to settle at a fair price, just as any two private parties
attempting to reach a settlement would.
Once the government condemns the property, the property owner
should have the right to seek legal advice in order to evaluate whether
the government’s offer is fair. When the attorney thinks that, based
on the relevant law, the offer is too low, the attorney can then help
her client build his case of valuation and defend the value of his
property throughout the condemnation procedure. Because the statute
only awards fees where the attorney achieves a benefit for her client,
this will discourage frivolous litigation. When the state condemns
through the Special Master or Assessor method and the offer is too
low, the condemnee will need the assistance of an attorney from the
point of the condemnation so that he can hire an appropriate appraiser
to determine the value of his taking and then gather the necessary
evidence and expert witnesses to establish his property’s value at the
hearing. 258 Likewise, a property owner appealing his award from a
Declaration of Taking, or appealing from a Special Master or
Assessor hearing, to the Superior Court will need access to these
important litigation tools. This statute reimburses the property owner
for these litigation expenses, however, only where they are necessary
to receive just and adequate compensation.
CONCLUSION
The Georgia General Assembly must constantly strive to
implement the Georgia Constitution’s guarantee that property owners
receive just compensation when their property is taken for public
use. 259 In order for society to reap the benefit of being able to acquire
private property for public projects, society must make the owner

258. See supra notes 95–103 and accompanying text for the procedure of the Special Master and
Assessor condemnation methods.
259. GA. CONST. Art. I § III, para. I (2009).
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whole. As the Georgia Supreme Court has acknowledged, making an
owner whole includes reimbursing him for his costs when he must
litigate to receive just compensation. 260
The legislature correctly decided to repeal Georgia’s former feeshifting statute, 261 since it deterred litigation and resulted in harm to
property owners when they were forced to pay the condemnor’s
expenses on appeal. However, the legislature left a void in Georgia
law by failing to adopt a new fee-shifting statute. At least twenty
other states have recognized the importance of this procedural
protection for landowners and have thus implemented fee-shifting
statutes. 262
Such a statute is crucial to ensuring that property owners in
Georgia receive just compensation in eminent domain actions. The
legislature should enact the proposed fee-shifting statute that applies
Florida’s benefits based approach while incorporating an element of
judicial discretion from Delaware’s statute. This statute will serve to
encourage condemnors to make more reasonable offers from the
outset, make property owners who are forced to litigate to receive just
compensation whole again, and also deter frivolous or unjustified
litigation—all while taking into consideration taxpayers’ concerns
associated with the cost of land acquisition.
Although public outcry from Kelo has largely died down,
Georgia’s focus on eminent domain should not end. Legislators must
continue to scrutinize the state’s procedural protections in order to
protect property owners. In times of dire need for public
infrastructure coupled with constrained budgets, the General
Assembly might be tempted to shy away from legislation that has the
potential for increasing the state’s acquisition costs. The legislature
must undoubtedly balance what is fair to property owners with what
is the least burdensome for taxpayers. A system requiring no payment
of compensation would be the extreme of a scheme favoring
taxpayers. However, this is not what the Georgia Constitution
260. White v. Ga. Power Co., 227 S.E.2d 385, 388 (Ga. 1976), rev’g Bowers v. Fulton County, 183
S.E.2d 347 (Ga. 1971).
261. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-84.1 (2005) (repealed 2006).
262. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
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requires. Property owners have a right to just compensation and this
constitutional guarantee should not be compromised, no matter the
state’s economic climate.
The General Assembly should grant Georgia property owners this
important legislative grace. If in the state’s struggle to provide
infrastructure for its ever-growing number of residents the
government makes a landowner an inadequate offer for her property,
she, like Florida resident Mr. Santoni,263 deserves to be reimbursed
for the costs she must bear in mounting a legal battle to fight for her
guaranteed just and adequate compensation.

263. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.
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